| The fact that the "Baker Report" has become a | | | | any outside nations, and is not motivated by them. It |
| best-seller reflects how trapped the American people | | | | doesn't really matter whether Syria or Iran are |
| feel by the current Iraqi nightmare and how frantically | | | | interested in fermenting unrest or prefer seeing it |
| search for anything that seems to offer a coherent | | | | reduced. Whatever influence they do have, still won't |
| way out. Unfortunately, however, the report has been | | | | fundamentally alter the final outcome of events. |
| classified in the non-fiction, rather than fiction section of | | | | The only perspective for Iraq now, and the only central |
| the bookshop. Despite some refreshingly honest | | | | question deliberately ignored by the Baker Report, is |
| comments about the general state of affairs in Iraq, | | | | the break up Iraq into three separate states. Its |
| the proposals it comes up with are pure fantasy. Its | | | | omission from the report is quite incredible. Even if they |
| power of effect is largely derived from the veracity of | | | | don't think it likely, nobody can ignore the fact that it is |
| a few descriptions of the state of affairs in Iraq, when | | | | very real possibility, with huge consequences for Iraq, |
| set against years of lies, distortion and deception from | | | | the US, the region and the world as a whole. To simply |
| the White House. In terms of really offering a way out | | | | ignore it, because they won't entertain the idea, don't |
| it, its about as useful as using a map of Beijing to get | | | | want it to happen, or don't fancy dealing with it, is |
| around Baghdad. Its findings amount to little more than | | | | astounding. Arguably, it is not just stupidity to omit it, but |
| finely worded contradictions intended to hide the truth | | | | a dereliction of duty from such supposedly, high |
| that there is no honourable retreat. Its key | | | | servants of the American state who are entrusted |
| recommendations are unworkable. The report itself | | | | with the responsibility of delivering such an important |
| admits that events there may have "already | | | | report. |
| overtaken" its findings. But, in truth, they never came | | | | Indeed all the report really says is what everyone |
| within sight of reading its number plates. | | | | knows. That the situation is "grave and deteriorating". |
| The key military proposal involves empowering the | | | | The Report acknowledges that " A slide toward |
| Iraqi Army by installing some 20,000 US army trainers | | | | chaos could trigger the collapse of the Iraqi |
| inside Iraqi units during combat missions. However, this | | | | government and a humanitarian catastrophe. |
| idea immediately shrivelled up like a piece of lighted | | | | Neighbouring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia |
| cigarette paper in an ashtray, when an Iraqi | | | | clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a |
| government minister asked where they would find the | | | | propaganda victory and expand its base of |
| small army of 20,000 translators? To those who like | | | | operations..." By this do they mean that Iraq will split into |
| floating ideas in geo-political bubbles, this annoying little | | | | three states? If so what are the implications in terms |
| technical detail brought down the report like a re-run of | | | | of a rethinking of America's military priorities as stated |
| the Hindenburg disaster. Think it through! The CIA itself | | | | in the objectives of the committee and its report? |
| can't find a few hundred Arabic speakers for | | | | Silence. Nothing to recommend? If the situation is |
| counter-intelligence in well-paid, cushy surroundings. | | | | "grave and deteriorating", how will it be after the year it |
| Where then will the military find 20,000 volunteers, | | | | takes to begin putting their proposals into effect? Are |
| fluent, bi-lingual translators (and, therefore most likely of | | | | we supposed to imagine that "grave and deteriorating" |
| Iraqi or other Arab nationality,) who are prepared to | | | | is a condition in suspended animation? Couldn't it well |
| risk their lives on the frontline, as well as risk death and | | | | be that US troops will still be on the ground when the |
| or torture at the hands of militia death-squads? Without | | | | government falls and Iraq breaks into 3 states? What |
| this huge, elite force of "kamikaze linguists", you might | | | | will they do then? What does the committee suggest |
| just as well send in another 20,000 Humvees without | | | | as America's military priorities if this happens in the |
| steering wheels, or 20,000 fighter planes without | | | | next few months? |
| navigation equipment. It's a non-starter. | | | | How should they react? Should they leave Baghdad |
| Secondly, the Baker report, like Bush, is demanding that | | | | and mixed areas to descend into sectarian genocide? |
| the Iraqi government to make "substantial progress" in | | | | Should they simply accept the Shia state ? Should |
| reducing sectarianism, achieving reconciliation and | | | | they try to forge alliances with current nationalist |
| strengthening "security and governance." Otherwise, it | | | | insurgents to fight Al Qaeda in the Sunni state or |
| threatens to massively reduce US "political, military and | | | | simply give up Al Anbar and re-deploy special forces |
| economic support." Apart from the obvious Catch 22, | | | | to neighbouring states? How will they respond if other |
| that it will reduce support, while demanding more | | | | countries in the region begin to break apart? This we |
| efficiency from the Iraqi government and then reduce | | | | suppose is beyond the remit of the Iraq Study Group, |
| forces anyway if the government isn't successful, the | | | | which only rethinks American military strategy one |
| idea that the Iraqi government can fulfil this role is just | | | | year in advance according to condition remaining |
| peddling a lie. | | | | exactly in correspondence with their proposals. |
| The Iraqi government is suspended in mid-air observing | | | | Otherwise, some committee will have to deal with it, no |
| a situation over which it has no control. It is a | | | | doubt? |
| government in name only. Its writ runs no further than | | | | Of course, the Iraq Study Group are well aware that |
| pieces of paper floating in the wind. Every time the | | | | this is the likely scenario. Their denial of it is not |
| government attempts to impose a curfew in Baghdad, | | | | accidental. In fact, the ramifications are so devastating |
| it is forced to revoke it, because they have no power | | | | for the US and the consequences so grave for the |
| to enforce or sustain it. The militias just continue firing | | | | region and the world, that the Study Group have |
| mortars across the city and death squads roamed | | | | evidently thought it prudent not to present this before |
| unrestricted carrying out revenge attacks. The police | | | | the American people, at this time. Obviously, it would |
| and army are powerless to stop them and prefer to | | | | mean admitting total and utter defeat. They would |
| stand aside or participated in the attacks. | | | | have to explain how the war on terror and with |
| At the end of the day, the state boils down to bodies | | | | invasion of Iraq had resulted not in a model democratic |
| of armed men willing and able to enforce the will of a | | | | state , but the creation of an Al Qaeda state in the |
| government or other state institution, which commands | | | | heart of the region, strengthening global terrorism and |
| it. Where this is not the case, as in times of civil war | | | | increasing the threat against the United States itself. |
| and revolution, the Army itself sometimes becomes | | | | They would have to explain how the world's most |
| the state. The Iraqi government, however, hasn't an | | | | powerful army crumbled under attack from urban |
| Army or a police force. Neither force is motivated or | | | | insurgency and sectarian militias. How a Shiite |
| able to support it and, neither can be depended upon | | | | theocratic regime hostile to the US and friendly to Iran |
| to carry out its will. They are token institutions | | | | came into being and how the hitherto almost unknown |
| displayed for symbolic international reasons under US | | | | conflict between Sunnis and Shias had mushroomed |
| pressure. | | | | into a destabilizing force throughout the region. Finally, |
| In reality, the Iraqi Army couldn't repulse an attack by | | | | how, not only did Iraq became a battleground for |
| the Swiss army on bicycles. And the police are little | | | | foreign powers, but how continental-scale civil war and |
| more than a fresh change of clothes for the militias. | | | | regional wars engulfed the whole region, destabilizing oil |
| Furthermore, to imagine the US forces are standing in | | | | markets and the global economy, pushing the US and |
| as substitutes and somehow holding up the Iraqi | | | | the world into recession or even a new economic |
| government, is just gobbledygook. The moment the | | | | depression. Clearly, the Group was unable to deal with |
| leaders of the main militias decide to withdraw totally | | | | this or felt it better brushed under the carpet for the |
| from government participation, the government will just | | | | time being. The only thing it can suggest is to call for a |
| collapse. All the cardboard cut-outs will topple over and | | | | regional conference on stability. Set against the |
| all the stage props will fall down. The Iraqi Army will | | | | Armageddon-like scenario, this single, rather limp |
| disappear along with its weapons and the police will | | | | recommendation sounds like a rather feeble admission |
| turn their equipment over to the respective militias. And | | | | of impotency. |
| don't imagine there will be any new elections, because | | | | Nevertheless, despite not entertaining the full |
| the fact is, NO IRAQI STATE EXISTS to carry them | | | | implications of the catastrophe in Iraq, the report lets |
| out and no popular demand exists for new ones. | | | | seep out some of the very real concerns of the |
| As for the US Army, they are about as effective as | | | | American ruling class for the stability of their system. In |
| the average UN observer force. Worse still, they have, | | | | the words of the report, "our ship of state has hit |
| in fact, already become a training force, but one for | | | | rough waters," "The global standing of the United |
| the insurgents and militias to hone their military skills for | | | | States could be diminished. Americans could become |
| use against each other and for the Al Qaeda to its | | | | more polarized." Behind the scenes even more blunt |
| groom its forces for future re-deployment around the | | | | and hard words are being expressed. There is |
| region. | | | | palpable concern that an unacceptable level of |
| Whatever pressure Baker or Bush might like to | | | | damage is being done to the credibility of the US, its |
| impose, there simply is no Iraqi government capable of | | | | institutions - most notably the Presidency- and the |
| fulfilling any of its roles, be they one's of economics, | | | | standing and morale of its Army. This is not only of |
| politics or security. And there is no one individual or | | | | concern globally, but also domestically, where the faith |
| group of individual capable of forming a real | | | | of the American people in the whole American system |
| government. The Baker Commission, and Bush | | | | is being put to test. |
| included, might just as well set benchmarks for the | | | | Consequently, the report serves the purpose more of |
| Icelandic government to disarm the militias, as expect | | | | a domestic tactically weapon, than the global, strategic |
| anything concrete to be carried out by the so-called | | | | document it has been blown to be. The purpose of the |
| government in Baghdad! In reality it is a ghost | | | | report is to corner a President who is not prepared to |
| government with a phantom army, which has no hope | | | | privately heed instructions from the shrouded inner |
| of taking on substance, let alone fulfilling any of the | | | | circles of the American ruling class. Bush is, therefore, |
| demands made on it by the Baker Report or the Bush | | | | being given a public, last chance. But so far, and not |
| administration. | | | | totally unexpectedly, his response has served not only |
| As for calling for discussions with Iran and Syria, this is | | | | to divorce him further from the ruling elite, but from the |
| both an admission by the US that the situation is out of | | | | American people as a whole. Increasingly, he appears |
| its control and a rather vain and desperate, last ditch | | | | divorced from reality, looking less like a person in denial |
| attempt to limit the damage to the US and the region. | | | | and more like someone in a state of clinical delusion. |
| But even if certain insurgent and militia groups are | | | | Between the lines of the report, the true message is |
| aided in by open borders or supplies of equipment and | | | | not whether American forces will be withdrawn by |
| training, the truth is that the scale and determination of | | | | 2008, but whether the President will have to be stood |
| the insurgency is not controlled by, or dependent on, | | | | down before that. |